Licensing and in-house.
Turning point
Fragrance, Eyewear, Watches. Who makes them, who profits, and what remains of the brand?
Luxury may seem to be entirely self-made, but that's not actually the case. 香水 is produced by a specialized company, eyewear by another large corporation, and watches are partly produced in-house while collaborating with another component maker. Even though the brand name is one, the actual production models coexist in multiple models. Misreading this can leave the brand's strength and price rationale somewhat unclear.
The interesting thing about this topic is that the questions are very simple: Who makes it? Who profits? And what remains for the brand as a result? When you line up these three items, licensing and in-house are not mere management differences, but a difference in philosophy about where the brand's core should reside.
First premise
Licensing is not a shortcut,
It has long been a standard feature of luxury.
ファッションの世界でライセンスが大きな意味を持つようになった流れを語るとき、ピエール・カルダンは避けて通れません。Vogue は、カルダンが 1959 年に既製服の量産ライセンスへ踏み込み、当時のオートクチュールの常識を揺らしたこと、そして後年には過剰なライセンス展開が「ブランド拡散」の象徴としても語られるようになったと整理しています。
This “Cardin issue” continues to cast a shadow. In 2024 the EU fined Pierre Cardin and Germany's authorized distributor Ahlers for practices that blocked parallel procurement within the EU. Reports indicate the problem concerned license operations from 2008 to 2011. In other words, licensing is a powerful tool to expand a brand, but if mishandled to include distribution and pricing controls, issues can easily arise outside the brand.
What matters here is not that licensing itself is bad, but that licensing has long been a highly rational means of expanding luxury. Building highly specialized categories in-house from scratch takes time and capital. Therefore, it is best to leave those categories to the specialists. This has always been the basic approach.
Fragrance
Where licensing is strongest
The area that has run most smoothly
香水 is a category where the licensing model has grown most naturally. The reason is simple: fragrance development, bottling, regulatory compliance, global distribution, and the cosmetics retail network are a completely different industry from clothing and bags. When Burberry ended its license with Interparfums in 2012 and brought fragrance and beauty in-house to pursue "greater profitability" and "stronger brand management," Reuters described it as a "big bet."
Burberry's decision is interesting. In 2012, owning it in-house seemed attractive for both brand management and profitability. However, in 2017 they switched to a contract that granted Coty a long-term global license for Burberry Beauty. Coty announced at that time that it had obtained exclusive long-term licenses for Burberry Beauty's fragrances, makeup, and skincare.
This back-and-forth shows that, in fragrance, simply wanting stronger brand management does not necessarily make in-house production the optimal solution. The perfume business requires not only manufacturing capability but also the distribution, marketing, and retail expertise that are extremely heavy. That is why specialized players like Coty and Interparfums have remained strong for a long time. Looking at Interparfums’ current portfolio, fragrances from multiple brands such as Jimmy Choo, Moncler, Montblanc, Coach, Lacoste line up, indicating that licensing-based cross-brand expansion remains effective.
Moreover, fragrance tends to function as an entry point for the maison. When Burberry partnered with Coty in 2017, it was emphasized that beauty plays the role of guiding new customers to the brand. In other words, in fragrance, as much as who makes it, who the brand brings in is a major theme.
Eyewear
The area where there is currently the strongest push toward in-house
A clearly visible area
ア Eyewear has long been a license-based kingdom, alongside perfumes. A 2023 filing by EssilorLuxottica shows licenses for Armani, Burberry, Chanel, Dolce&Gabbana, Ferrari, Jimmy Choo, Moncler, Prada, and more. Looking at this alone, eyewear appears to be a classic category in which a brand lends its name and a specialist company designs and distributes the products.
However, in this area there have been clear changes over the past decade. In 2014, Kering established Kering Eyewear, with the aim of creating the first pure-play luxury company in the luxury eyewear industry. Both the official Kering site and the Kering Eyewear site explicitly state the founding in 2014 and the intention to cultivate in-house expertise.
ここで面白いのは、Kering Eyewear が単なる“自社ブランド向けの内製部門”に留まらなかったことです。2017 年には Richemont 系ブランドとの提携が始まり、2021 年には LINDBERG を買収し、2022 年には Maui Jim を取得、2025 年には Visard と Mistral に踏み込む形で工業的な基盤も強化しています。
Kering は、「アイウェアは外に任せるもの」から「ブランドグループの中で利益とノウハウを回収するもの」へ発想を変えたわけです。
この動きが示すのは、アイウェアではブランド側が“残るもの”を増やしたかった、ということです。ライセンス型だと、ブランドに残るのはロイヤルティと露出です。一方、直営化・準直営化すると、残るのはそれに加えて、製品開発の知見、流通の主導権、顧客データ、そして利益そのものになります。
もっとも、すべてが直営化へ向かうわけではありません。2025 年には Kering Eyewear が Valentino のアイウェアを手がける契約が報じられました。これは Valentino にとってはライセンス型に近い形でも、相手が“ラグジュアリー側の専門会社”になっている点が従来と少し違う。つまり現在のアイウェアは、「外注か内製か」という二択ではなく、“誰の側に近い専門会社が握るか”が勝負になっています。
時計
ライセンスよりも
“垂直統合の深さ”が問われる領域
時計は、香水ともアイウェアとも少し性格が違います。ここではブランド名の貸し借り以上に、「ムーブメントやケースや組立のどこまでを自分で持つか」が価値に直結しやすい。つまり、ライセンスの有無より“垂直統合の深さ”が重要になります。
LVMH は自らのモデルとして、原材料調達から製造、選択的流通まで含む垂直統合を掲げています。LVMH のミッションやモデルの説明でも、その点はかなり明確です。時計・ジュエリーは、この発想と相性が良い。なぜなら、高級時計は“中身の技術”が説得力に直結するからです。
最近の動きでは、LVMH のウォッチ部門が 2025 年に La Joux-Perret に少数出資し、TAG Heuer や Tiffany の時計に関わる開発基盤を強めたことが Reuters で報じられました。これは、時計では「名前だけ持つ」よりも「技術の源流に近づく」ほうが長期の強さになる、という考え方の表れに見えます。
逆に、Kering が 2022 年に Girard-Perregaux と Ulysse Nardin を手放したことも示唆的です。Kering 自体の文書には売却完了が記されています。つまり時計は、持てば強くなるカテゴリではない。むしろ、技術・工場・部品・開発投資を長く背負えるグループだけが、直営化のメリットを享受しやすい。ここは香水やアイウェアよりずっとシビアです。
誰が儲けるのか
ライセンスと直営化の一番
現実的な違い
ここまでを乱暴にまとめると、ライセンスと直営化の差は、利益の取り分の差です。ただ、もう少し正確に言うと、「利益の取り分」と「学習の蓄積」の差です。
ライセンス型では、ブランド側はロイヤルティを取りやすい。在庫や設備投資、製造ノウハウの重さは相手が引き受ける。その代わり、商品企画と流通の細部、顧客データ、カテゴリごとの改善知見は、ブランド側に十分には残りにくい。Burberry が 2012 年にインハウスを志向したときに「より大きな利益」と「より強いコントロール」が狙いとして語られたのは、まさにこの点です。
直営化では、利益もリスクもブランド側が引き受ける。その代わり、売れ筋の変化、地域差、素材の反応、顧客の戻り方など、次の製品に効く情報が蓄積しやすい。Kering Eyewear が短期間で“事業そのもの”として大きくなったのは、この蓄積をグループ内に残せたからだとも読めます。
何がブランドに残るのか
最後に残るのは、利益よりも
“主導権”かもしれない
で Ultimately, what remains on the brand side? In perfumes, how far can you design the entry to the brand yourself? In eyewear, how far can you run a category close to the fashion brand's face with your own logic? In watches, how far can you maintain the craftsmanship and technical legitimacy without relying on external sources?
The strength of a licensing model is that it can spread quickly. The strength of direct ownership is that learning and control remain. And looking at recent luxury, it seems they are not moving everything to direct control; rather, per category they answer differently: "entry points via licensing", "face-of-the-brand categories through semi-direct operation", and "the core technology through vertical integration".
Here lies the turning point. Brands no longer simply choose between licensing and direct operation. They decide which categories to use to extend the name, which to make the profit core, and which to serve as the foundation of trust. This separation is what they do.
When you look at it, including how the name is used,
What the brand wants to protect
It becomes clear.
What makes MOOD interesting is that even within the same brand, in perfumes it appears as the "entry brand", in eyewear as the "face of the brand", and in watches as the "brand of technology", revealing different expressions.
Even if the designers' and maisons' philosophies are the same, you can glimpse the brand's true intent by what it leaves in each category.
The appeal of luxury reading isn't limited to clothes alone. When you look at it including how the name is used, you gradually see what the brand guards, what it entrusts to the outside, and what it wants to keep inside itself.
